Since the end of the separatist wars in Georgia’ s breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (respectively in 1992 and 1993), Russian political, business and intellectual circles openly and tirelessly promoted on the highest levels the idea of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s national self-determination and independence from Georgia.
It is no longer the subject of the debate that Russia itself in fact represents a large part of the problem. Russia has inserted itself into these conflicts, into a role in which they politically, military and financially supported and continue to support separatist regimes against newly independent, pro-Western Georgia. The question is whether Russia really needs and whether it really supports the independence of these two tiny Georgian enclaves?
Let’s start from the question of whether Russia really needs the independence of these separatist provinces.
The ethnic Abkhazs (or Apsuas as they call themselves) in Abkhazia represented some 17% of total Abkhazia’s population before the war began and local 350,000 Georgians were expelled from their homes. Currently there are some 70,000 Abkhazs living in the whole of Abkhazia. The picture is not much better in South Ossetia. There are mere 50,000 Ossetians living in entire region that barely make up some 48% of the province’s whole population.
The question for Russia is if two small ethnic groups which don’t even reach 70,000 can have national independence, why about 60 different nationalities currently being part of Russian Federation, many of them with the population of no less than 1 million people, with very rich history, strong national identities and distinctive cultures and languages can’t breakaway from Moscow and become independent states? As some highest ranking Russian politicians signaled at various occasions, Moscow very well understands that independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will explode not only Russia’s North Caucasus (which is rightly is referred to as an “ethnic power keg”) with increasing anti-Russian sentiments, more than 10 large ethnic groups and 7 autonomous republics but entire Russian Federation, in which dozens of ethnic groups quietly, but ardently dream about succession from Moscow.
Russia actually already experienced how self-destructive it can be for Russia to support separatist wars in other countries. The war in Chechnya, which broke up right after the end of the separatist war in Abkhazia, is a vivid example with 60,000 Russian soldiers and 200,000 Chechen civilians killed and another 200,000 civilians driven out of Chechnya. This war laid Chechnya to waste and destabilized the whole North Caucasus and southern Russia for the foreseeable future.
This then begs the question if Russia doesn’t need Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, than why does Russia support them? However, the facts speak for another conclusion. After the end of the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow maintained significant military contingents in both provinces that operate as “peacekeepers” under UN auspices. In fact, these Russian “peacekeepers” actively and diligently worked to buttress separatist regimes and supported them in their punitive military actions against the remaining local Georgian population. Additionally, in blunt violation of all international laws President Putin’s administration massively granted Russian citizenship to local Abkhazs and Ossetians in fact making them lose their legal right of participation in Georgia’s political life. By this covert behavior Kremlin de-facto carried out the act of annexation of foreign territory and population. Also, Moscow kept both provinces under tight political control, staffing separatist governments’ key ministries with ethnic Russians. All political matters-of greater or lesser importance-whether it’s conducting of local, staged and illegitimate elections, training separatist militias or fixing a broken central water pipe is decided in Moscow or by Kremlin appointed local warlords. These regions are as closely watched and supervised by Moscow as any other republic of Russian Federation.
Russia has not helped to revive devastated economies of separatist enclaves either. Once extremely wealthy regions, with well developed tourism and agricultural businesses and infrastructure, especially in Abkhazia, lay in ruins. Cities destroyed or heavily damaged during the wars still were not reconstructed. After the wars, 95% of local populations fell below poverty line. Current “economies” of these separatist provinces are largely based on illegal trade (of anything from weapons and narcotics to stolen cars and contraband beef raviolis) and racketeering. These shady economies are run by local, corrupt and abusive separatist regimes and different sorts of Moscow loyal Russian, Abkhaz, Armenian and Ossetian criminal business groups which fought against Georgia in two separatist wars.
Small Russian financial aid barely keeps the local Ossetians and Abkhazs alive, forcing them to leave their homes to Russia in search of daily bread. Neither of these regions experienced any healthy investments, that is if we don’t take into account the villas bought in Abkhazia by “victorious” Russian military or the money thrown in the separatist regions by various criminal authorities for the purpose of money laundering.
So based on all above said, the question remains- if a country like Russia really supports the independence of the breakaway political entities such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, should not it help them to develop their own political structures and independent political governance instead of staffing their ministries with ethnic Russians and tightly controlling every aspect of social-economic and political lives of the regions? Shouldn’t Russia help these provinces to develop their own citizenship institutions instead of just granting local population Russian citizenship? Should not Moscow try to invest money heavily in local economies to rebuild them and help them to live as independent states instead of keeping local populations in utter poverty and letting local corrupt regimes and mafia groups run the shady economies?
There is one simple answer to all these questions- Russia doesn’t support and strive for their independence.
As multiple analyses and research suggests, Moscow has several working plans and goals in regards to Abkhazia and South Ossetia and in the Wider spectrum of Georgia in its entirety.
The top priority for Russia in South Caucasus is to reinstate its full political, military and economic influence on geostrategically pivotal, pro-Western Georgia that hosts transportation routes of Azerbaijan’s abundant gas and oil recourses to the West and has direct land access to Russian satellite Armenia. Everything in South Caucasus for Kremlin evolves around this goal: in best case scenario to bring Georgia entirely under Moscow’s sway and if this is not fully possible than prevent Georgia’s rapid drift towards the West and into Euro-Atlantic institutions and turn the country into neutral, maximally weak state on its southern borders. In this game Abkhazia and South Ossetia are mere playing cards in the hands of Russia.
The best outcome for Moscow would be to regain full, unconditional dominance on Georgia and at the same time incorporate breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Russian Federation proper.
If full control over Georgia is not possible than Moscow has another plan and slightly less ambitious goal in order to neutralize Georgia as a strong and pro-Western country. The joint analyses of various statements of Kremlin loyal Russian parliamentarians, intellectuals, Russian state media and Gazprom executives signal that official Moscow would be willing to offer to Georgia to reintegrate the separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia on the bases of loose confederation which would give Abkhazia and South Ossetia control over Georgia’s foreign policy (SIC) and grant them right of succession from Georgia. Needless to say this scenario turns Georgia into immensely weakened state with its foreign policy course hijacked by Kremlin loyal regional regimes and leaves the country under the permanent danger of disintegration. But this is not all. Additionally, Russia wants full possession of vital North-South gas pipeline running via Georgia from Russia to Armenia and further gas-rich Iran. And Also Kremlin wants a guarantee from Georgia that the country will never join NATO or European Union.
There is one more plan. In the case that Moscow cannot regain full control over Georgia, and cannot force an agreement on a self-destructive, loose confederation and on rejection of NATO, EU integration-then for Moscow both Abkhazia and South Ossetia lose their bargaining power vis-à-vis Georgia. The Kremlin simply will feel fully compelled to incorporate them into Russian Federation. (Puppet, separatist regime in Abkhazia had already asked Russia several times to be accepted as an associate member of Russian Federation, while South Ossetian regime demanded from Kremlin to be united with Russia as one of the subjects of the federation). Based on the reasoning established thus far, Russia will not allow their independence. Moscow can accept their independence just as a transitional step from being outlaw, unrecognized separatist political entities to becoming “lawful” part of vast Russia. As it seems, strong, but not almighty Russia still cares that in the eyes of international community this incorporation will look more like the product of “national self-determination of independent Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples” than outright occupation and annexation, as it is, of the territories of sovereign Georgia.
Based on all the above said it is plainly clear that Russia can not be a peacekeeper and peacemaker in these conflicts as it claims to be. It is a side in the conflicts with its own political aims and is not interested in the true and just resolution of these “frozen conflicts.” The Russian dominated peacekeeping formats in Abkhazia and South Ossetia simply kill any attempts of real peacemaking by the Georgian side. These peacekeeping formats were signed under tight Russian supervision pressured on defeated Georgia and its weak, corrupt regime of Eduard Shevardnadze in early 1990’s. They were specifically designed to guarantee political and military balance of power in overwhelming favor of separatists and Russia and cemented Moscow’s full control over the breakaway regions.
Notorious “Sochi Agreement”, signed between Russia and Georgia in 1992, by later Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the head of provisional Georgian government Eduard Shevardnadze ended hostilities in South Ossetia (after signing this agreement about 1000 people were killed or disappeared in the conflict zone). But the price of this superficial ceasefire agreement was very heavy for Georgia indeed. The agreement imposed “the conflict zone” within 30 kilometers (approximately 18 miles) radius of South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali. A quadripartite negotiating committee was formed, with the participation of Russia, Russia’s North Ossetia republic, separatist, pro-Russian South Ossetia on one side and Georgia on another side. Plus, the conflict zone would be patrolled by 2000 armed peacekeepers, each side allowed to keep 500 troops in the conflict zone. Needles to say this agreement, signed by war ravaged and economically devastated Georgia in early 1990’s, left the country one against three in the “Quadripartite Committee”, in the body where all the military, political and economic questions were being decided affecting the breakaway province. Besides, the agreement disproportionately put 500 Georgian peacekeepers against 1500 Russian and their allied local separatist troops. It is entirely clear that this peacekeeping format leaves no theoretical chance for Georgia to affect anything in the conflict zone, not to mention about the resolution of the South Ossetian conflict, based on the basic principles of international law and the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Abkhazia’s existing peacekeeping format is not any better if not much worth. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) established in 1993 and expanded in 1994, after signing the Agreement on Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, oversees implementation of peacekeeping process and reports to UN Security Council. UNOMIG mandate is extended periodically by the Security Council. And generally speaking all basic questions related to Abkhazia conflict resolution is going through UN Security Council where Russia holds permanent seat and a veto power. Through the Security Council, since the end of the armed hostilities, Moscow successfully halted (and continues to halt) multiple attempts of Georgia to solve the conflict. High Representative to the Secretary-General in the conflict zone and “UN Secretary-General's Group of Friends of Georgia" (consisting of United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and cynically of Russia) proved highly ineffective in the conflict resolution process. The Moscow’s real muscle in the Abkhazia is 2000 men large Russian peacekeeping force deployed by Kremlin dominated Commonwealth of Independent States. This is the force that has been openly and bluntly supporting Abkhazia’s separatist regime, carrying out punitive military expeditions along with separatist militia, against the remnants of local Georgia population in the region. It must be mentioned here that after the deployment of Russian “peacekeeping” forces about 2000 people were killed, abducted and disappeared from the conflict zone.
In order to change existing peacekeeping formats full and active international engagement is needed, something Russia fiercely opposes. As long as international community (basically the West: USA, OSCE, EU, UN) continues to show their exaggerated caution not to aggravate Russia, Moscow continues its policy of almost daily blackmail against Georgia in separatist provinces. As far as the process of Georgia’s economic-political development and Euro-Atlantic integration intensifies (perceived as dangerous for Russia by the official Kremlin), there immediately occurs string of various provocations in separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Shootings, robberies, road-blockings, kidnappings and killings of local Georgians in these regions become part of every day life, depending on the intensity of pro-Western, reformist activity of Tbilisi. All these even more tenses already flammable regions, disrupt Georgian government and absorb huge political, diplomatic and economic resources on the part of Georgia. Very damagingly, the heightened tensions greatly hurt Georgia’s international image as a stable, peacefully developing nation and upset investment climate in the country.
But what about Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples that are viewed as mere tools by the Kremlin in its subversive and complex geopolitical game in South Caucasus? There are serious signs that Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples are already tired of their corrupt, abusive regimes and of more than a decade long instability, lawlessness, mafia rule and poverty. They desire peace, jobs, opportunities and cultural development. Many of them started to realize that they were simply dragged into dirty, bloody political game staged by local and foreign criminal political groups. Official Tbilisi doesn’t hold whole Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples accountable for the ethnic cleansings which their ruling separatist regimes carried out against Georgians during and after the wars. Rapidly developing post-Rose Revolution Georgia offers to Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples reconciliation, widest possible political autonomies, economic opportunities and cultural preservation and development. It takes courage, wisdom and determination on their part to make mutual steps. United, democratic and prosperous Georgia is the only country where tiny Abkhaz and Ossetian ethnic groups can truly flourish economically, culturally and preserve their national-identities. Alternatives can be rule of extremist, corrupt regimes, isolation, economic devastation or cultural and ethnic assimilation in a vast, semi-authoritarian country.
Process of reconciliation in South Ossetia has begun. The emergence of Dimidtri Sanakoev’s provisional administration in the region is huge step in this direction. Dimitri Sanakoev, local ethnic Ossetian, loudly spoke up against the South Ossetia’s separatist regime’s criminal doings and de-facto Russian annexation. He emphasizes on the historical destiny of Georgian and Ossetian peoples in united Georgia. Mr. Sanakoev (and his administration) is widely backed by local Ossetians and his public support is rising gradually.
The process of reconciliation should continue, enlarge and eventually move to Abkhazia. This process will meet many deliberate obstacles, but again, it’s up to Abkhaz and Ossetian peoples to fully realize that they have been deceived, used and thrown out by those who posed and still are posing as liberators.
about Vasili Rukhadze |
