Ethnic Conflict as a Tool of Outside Influence

Ethnic Conflict as a Tool of Outside Influence: An Examination of Abkhazia and Kosovo
In the 1990’s the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to a series of internal skirmishes within these former empires for territorial and political control. These political struggles often times resulted in ethnic conflict, and is some cases ethnic cleansing. Religious and cultural differences between Georgians and Abkhazians, and Kosovars and Serbians, namely Islam vs. Christianity, are often cited as the cause of ethnic conflict and cleansing, however, in actual fact it was a construction of the Serbian and Russian leadership. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash Of Civilizations” suggestion, that different cultures will inevitably come to blows, does not hold any explanatory weight in an analysis of these ethnic conflicts.

[1] The collapse of the earlier dominant federations in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region led to the creation of newly independent states, such as Georgia, Bosnia, Slovenia etc..., over which the remnants of power ( the Russian Federation, and Serbia) sought undue influence, in essence a form of modern imperialism. Serbia and the Russian Federation are guilty of using the tools of excessive nationalism to stir up ethnic conflict in both Georgia and Kosovo, and to increase control in the regions. To understand the reasons behind Serbia and the Russian Federation’s use of ethnic diversity as a method of regional destabilization in an attempt to gain political control, we must first examine the history, and ethnic composition of Kosovo and Abkhazia. We will examine in what manner Serbia and Russia were directly involved in stirring ethnic hatred in Abkhazia and Kosovo, as well as the specific interests of these two states in the regions in which they involved themselves. The use of ethnic conflict in the 1990’s, as a last ditch attempt to establish some degree of political control over former spheres of influence, resulted in the horrific loss of human life, however, these events were for the most part ignored by the Western world until the conflict threatened to spread to the international level. The relationship between the creation of extreme nationalism and the promotion of ethnic hatred as a tool of outside political influence, is not a new event, however the 1990’s have seen the creation of deep-seeded hatreds that threaten to span generations and cause an irreparable rift. Some analysts of ethnic conflict look to other explanatory variables, religion, language, culture, and economic hardship, to understand the eruption of ethnic conflict. However, diversity does not equate violence nor ethnic cleansing, the autonomy movements in Kosovo and Abkhazia have been used to provoke ethnic violence to maintain outside political control and influence. The loss of human life, change in ethnic composition, and the ultimate futility of using ethnic conflict to gain clear political control over former spheres of influence have demonstrated that it is not an effective tool of political control, only one that clearly violates human rights. As the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and Kosovo are examined, it will become clear that ethnic hatred is created by states with interests in territorial, political and resource gain, but that this method is ultimately dangerous, destabilizing, and will backfire into a situation that will continue for generations.





Abkhazia and Georgia: A Historical Overview

Abkhazia is a small region in Transcaucasia located within the Republic Of Georgia, bordering the Black Sea.[2] It is named for its indigenous North West Caucasian people, the Abkhaz (also known as the Apsua), religiously composed of both Christians and Sunni Muslims (religious majority); some ninety to one hundred thousand Abkhazians inhabit the territory of Abkhazia.[3] Abkhazia is also one of the most resource rich areas of the former Soviet Union.[4] During the Soviet years, Abkhazia was considered to be an autonomous region, within the Soviet Republic of Georgia.[5] With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Georgia gained territorial independence from the newly formed Russian Federation, and Abkhazia expected similar independence from Georgia.[6] In 1991, the newly formed Georgian Assembly, under the leadership of President Eduard Shevardnadze (Gorbachev’s onetime foreign minister), reinstalled the Georgian Constitution of 1921, which revoked the national autonomy of the Abkhazians, against expectations of independence.[7] As a result of this decision, fighting broke out between the Abkhazians and Georgians in Abkhazia in 1992.[8] The Abkhazian-Georgian war, of 1992-1993, is of interest to many political scientists, as the Abkhazians ethnically cleansed the Georgians, despite only composing 17.3% of Abkhazia’s population, and 1.8% of Georgia’s total population.[9] The war in Abkhazia against Georgia was not simply a case of Apsuan versus Georgian. The Confederation Of The Peoples of the Caucasus (CPC) was formed in 1989 by six different national movement groups in the region, and initiated by the Abkhaz as a result of the threat from Georgia to its independence. The CPC members supported the Abkhazians during the 1992-1993 war, together with the local Armenians and the Russian military.[10]  Despite lobbying by Georgia to have the UN forcibly bring an end to the war with Abkhazia, that it was losing, they found that were largely ignored by the international community, and in June 1994 Russian peacekeeping troops were sent into Abkhazia to bring stability to the region.[11] Abkhazia’s victory over Georgia has led to the economic collapse of the region, as well major changes to the ethnic composition of Abkhazia.[12]


 Ethnic Population Composition Of Abkhazian ASSR Population, 1989:


Ethnic Group         Percentage Of Population

Georgians:      242,000 --- 46.2%

Armenians:       77,000 --- 14.6%

Russians:          74,000 --- 14.2%

Abkhaz:            91,000 --- 17.3%

Others:            40,000 ---   7.7%

Total:             524,000[13] 



Kosovo: A Historical Overview:


           Kosovo is today an autonomous territory in the Balkans, located between Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania.[14] The ethnic composition of Kosovo is mainly ethnic Albanian, with religious roots in the Muslim faith.[15] Kosovo’s past lays in membership with the former Yugoslavia. However, even in those days, Kosovo’s distinct ethnic composition and culture granted it a measure of autonomy, though not full territorial autonomy. The 1946 Constitution of Yugoslavia, under the Yugoslav leadership of Tito, set out to “carefully set a balance of power among the peoples and minorities of Yugoslavia over a potential threat of Serbian predominance…(a process) complicated by the fact that the Serbian republic also contained the vast majority of Yugoslavia’s minorities… the Serbs themselves could not be united in a single republic without infringing the rights of other nationalities.”[16] As a result of this problem, Article 103 of the 1946 Constitution stated, “The People’s republic of Serbia includes within its structure the … Autonomous Region of Kosovo,” placing Kosovo under Serbian control, and with no clear outline for what rights it, as an “autonomous region,” would be granted.[17] With the death of leader Tito in 1980, and the later collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the Baltic States, a unified Yugoslavia disintegrated. By 1989 it was clear that the bridge between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo was crumbling, as tensions rose and Serbian aggression in the region increased. In 1990 Serbia revoked Kosovo’s political autonomy.[18] In 1991, Albanian political leaders in Kosovo declared the Republic of Kosovo, which only Albania recognized.[19] Throughout the 1990’s the Serbian government, under President Milosevic, tightened its hold on Kosovo, and by 1996 the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had arisen from the plight of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. From 1996 – 2000 increased tension and hostilities between Serbians and Kosovars led to ethnic hate crimes, and the situation boiled over, until NATO’s involvement brought an end to the conflict in 2000.[20]


Kosovo Population Census Data: 1991[21]

Ethnic Group     Percentage Of Population

Albanians:     1,226,736 --- 82.2%

Serbs:                195,301 ---   9.9%

Montenegrins:   20,045 ---   1.0%

Muslims:           57,048 ---   2.9%

Gypsies:            42,806 ---   2.2%

Turks:               10,838 ---   0.5%

Croats:                  8,161 ---   0.4%O

thers:              12,498 ---   0.7%

Total Population:                    1,954,747 



The Russian Federation and Serbia: The ‘New’ Imperialism

           The Russian Federation and Serbia have been greatly involved in the creation of ethnic conflict in Abkhazia and Kosovo. However, the question remains as to why these countries seek to influence these regions. The days of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, and centralized Yugoslav control over its various ethnic factions are gone. With no traditional imperial ability to gain control over its spheres of influence, Russian and Serbian leadership have turned to a form of ‘new’ imperialism; destabilizing a region through the creation of intense and violent ethnic conflict, and from this destabilization force its political influence over these regions. The former prestige of these territories have fallen from the dominant ethnic groups, the Serbs and Russians, much to the distaste of their leadership, therefore leading them to attempt to stop any sincere independence from its formers spheres of power. Therefore, Russia has sought to destabilize Georgia through Abkhazia, and Serbia has created ethnic turmoil in Kosovo to maintain control over the former Yugoslav region. But what specific and strategic interests do Russia and Serbia have in Georgia/Abkhazia and Kosovo?.

Abkhazia is known as being “one of the richest provinces of the former Soviet republic,” with borders on the Black Sea and Georgia.[22] In 1991, the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia were poised for independence from the Soviet Union, and would soon be areas open to international investment and interest.[23] Russia’s loss of territorial control was made all the worse by the thought of foreign interests dictating policy in its “own backyard.”[24] The solution to this problem was found in stirring up ethnic conflict and violence, making such areas unattractive to outside investment and interest, cementing Russia’s political influence and control over the area.[25] Oil also plays a role in Russia’s interests in destabilizing the Caucasus; the planned pipeline system connecting oil fields in Central Asia to Western Europe is poised to pass through Georgia and the independent Caucasus states, which has infuriated Russian leaders, such as Boris Yeltsin.[26] Another factor in the rise of Russian interests in maintaining control over Georgia, through Abkhazia, are the national election results. Since December 1993 Russia’s military elite have been gaining political strength, forcing the issues of Russian nationalism and chauvinism into political and electoral debate.[27]



           Kosovo had long been held to have a strategic geopolitcal value in the former Yugoslavia, and held a different form of value to Serbia in the 1980’s and 1990’s. A government report from 1953 stated, “situated in the central part of the Balkans…(Kosovo) divides Montenegro from Serbia and these two, in turn form Macedonia. These lands of the Federative Yugoslavia will never be strongly tied to each other as long as they do not obtain a direct ethnic border.”[28] In other words, Yugoslavia valued Kosovo’s geographical position in offsetting any substantial national movements among its many ethnic groups. However, with the collapse of a unified Yugoslavia, interest in Kosovo came mainly from Serbia, of which it was still a fragment. In the 1980’s Serbian political leaders Ivan Stambolic and Slobodan Milosevic, struggled for political power. Both Milsoevic and Stambolic saw the potential political power to be gained in Kosovo if they could be seen as the “champion of the Kosovo Serbs.”[29] Milsosevic stoked the flame of Serbian nationalism to gain political control in a time of economic hardship, through which he used the issue of ethnic struggle.[30] It is said that, “Milosevic needed a convenient scapegoat on which to blame the failures of the Serb nation to take its historic place as leader of the Yugoslavs... He hadn’t pursued Serb claims in that province during the wars with the other republics in view of having to fight on a second front. However, with the wars over, the economy in ruins, and calls for his resignation growing, Milosevic had to turn to Kosovo and raise the spectre of nationalism once more – if for no other reason than to ensure his own political survival.”[31] Russian and Serbian interests in Kosovo and Georgia have manifested themselves in a form of ‘new’ imperialism, through which ethnic conflict has been created to help these states gain control over their former spheres of influence. 


The Russian Federation and Serbia: Involvement In The Creation Of Ethnic Conflict



Once we have developed an understanding of the motivation behind the creation of ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing in both Kosovo and Abkhazia, we must examine the ways in which the Serbian government, under Slobodan Milosevic, and the Russian Federation, under Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, have involved themselves in the creation of hatred between those of different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds. Russia’s war on Georgia, through the conflict in Abkhazia, has remained undeclared; a new form of warfare to join a new form of imperialism.[32] However, just because Russia hasn’t officially made its position against Georgia known, does not mean that the Russian Federation isn’t directly involved in the creation of ethnic conflict in Abkhazia, or is not participating with its military in maintaining Georgian submission. Russia has manipulated the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity of the Caucasus. Using the tool of extreme ethno-nationalism in Abkhazia, Russia has managed to turn dissatisfaction with the Georgian government into 17% of the population slaughtering and expelling the Georgians from within its province, and using its weapons and “peacekeeping troops” to fend off the Georgian republic.[33] The Russian’s are guilty of having used propaganda to ignite the Abkhazian secession movement from Georgia; despite the fact that secession was opposed by Georgians inside Abkhazia, who constituted the majority of the population.[34] Russia has participated directly in the training of Abkhazian military units, using the Russian special services, and has also provided the Abkhazians with weapons.[35] Islam has also been manipulated by the Russian Federation to unite the Muslims of the Caucasus against “Christian” Georgia.[36] UN sanctioned Russian “Peacekeeping Forces” helped launch attacks against the Georgians during the war with Abkhazia.[37] Through the use of Russian military weapons, propaganda, and cultural and religious strategy, the Georgian military was fully expelled from Abkhazia in July 1992.



           Serbia’s participation in Kosovo’s massive ethnic conflict and experiences with ethnic cleansing was more obviously direct than Russia’s participation in Georgia. Between 1989 and 1990 Serbia began the process of revoking the autonomous rights of Kosovo, placing it back under clear Serbian control.[38] Provincial authorities were deprived of their power in Kosovo, mass dismissals of Albanians from their places of employment occurred, and Albanian culture in Kosovo was dismantled. Albanian books were removed from the libraries, and Albanian children and teachers were prevented from attending school, unless they agreed to follow a Serbian curriculum.[39] Serbian control over the media became clear as “increasingly inflammatory and propagandistic use of the media (was used) to incite intercommunal fear and anger.”[40]  However, these attempts to remove Albanian culture from Kosovo were only the tip of the iceberg in Serbian action within the province. Kosovar resistance against Serbia through the Kosovo Liberation Army was countered through the “torching” of several Kosovar villages.[41] By 1998, the Serbian army had entered Kosovo and was directly involved in the slaughter and forced immigration of Albanians in the territory.[42]  Russia and Serbia’s direct involvement in creating and participating in the ethnic conflict in Abkhazia and Kosovo, demonstrates the harsh truth, that the political aims of leaders in Russia and Serbia, to extend their spheres of influence to their former glory, have led to the creation of horrific ethnic violence, of whose repercussions go well beyond the political level.



Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Cleansing: Effective Tools Of Outside Influence?

           With an examination of why the Russian Federation and Serbian governments participated in the creation of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Abkhazia, as well as in what manner they stirred up ethnic tension, the question that must be asked is whether or not ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing was an effective tool in allowing outside powers to gain political influence beyond their borders. It is clear that the instability of Kosovo and Georgia as a result of ethnic conflict makes these regions more susceptible to outside influence. As a result of Russia’s interference in Abkhazia, the Georgian government must now deal with inter-ethnic wars within its own borders, dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, instead of focussing all its attention on maintaining its territorial and political integrity against Russian ambitions.[43] Russia has successfully used ethnic conflict and violence as a means of opening Georgia up to Russian influence, through its ‘voluntary” membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States.[44] However, Russian ‘success’ in using ethnic violence is far from absolute. The devastation on the economies of Georgia and Abkhazia, the massive loss of human life, as well as the hatred created by ethnic violence make these areas of little use to the Russian government, other than having some measure of control over Georgia. The war in Abkhazia has also added to Russia’s problems with Chechnya, as armed Chechens participated in the war against Georgia, adding to their arsenal as well as their military training, all which helped aid them in their struggle against Russia.[45] The oil pipeline factor, also failed; Russia’s desire to have the pipeline within its borders has not been achieved through the war in the Caucasus.



          Kosovo’s experience with ethnic conflict and ethnic cleansing as a political form of imperialism, demonstrates to what degree this plan can fail. Between 1999-2000 the Serbian government under the leadership under Slobodan Milosevic collapsed. In July 1999 protests calling for the overthrow of Milosevic began, and in September 2000 Milosevic lost the Serbian national election.[46] The failure of ethnic conflict as a political tool in Kosovo lays in the fact that the violence was too prominent and taken too far. The international community could no longer avoid the mass violence and excessive force of Serbians against the Albanians in Kosovo, and in 1999 NATO involved itself in the conflict, putting down the violence.[47] Peacekeeping forces were installed in Kosovo, to prevent further ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians.[48] Kosovo’s experience with ‘new’ imperialism shows the devastation of the plan, and the lack of political control it intends to gain through ethnic conflict. Milosevic’s aims to maintain power through nationalism and chauvinism, to distract from Serbia’s true economic and political problems, failed, leading to his loss of power and the further economic, social and ethnic devastation of the former Yugoslav states. For all the evidence demonstrating the creation of ethnic conflict to serve outside political means, some political scientists and observers of ethnic violence claim that ethnic conflict arises out of religious, linguistic, historical and cultural differences.



Ethnic Conflict: A Natural Phenomena ?

While it is clear to some that ethnic conflict is simply used as tool of political control, or a ‘new’ form of imperialism, some political scientists and scholars argue that ethnic conflict arises out of genuine difference: linguistic, religious, historical and cultural. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” perhaps best summarizes this perspective in which “the inability of people to form political communities across civilizational divides, such as Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam, is at the root of contemporary ‘ethnic conflicts’.”[49] The religious and historical diversity of various “minority groups” in the Caucasus is at times cited as the cause of the conflict in Abkhazia. Many see the Abkhazian-Georgian war of 1992-1993 as the result of the tensions between the Caucasus Muslim and Georgian Christian populations boiling over, combined with the historical disputes over which group is entitled to rule over which areas.[50] However, the Abkhazian’s are amongst themselves divided in faith; while the majority remain Muslim, there is a segment of the Apsua population that is Christian.[51] Georgia is further known to be a fairly secular state, despite its extremely Christian reputation.[52] In the former Yugoslavia “twenty-four ethnic groups, three main languages, three main religions, two alphabets, and six republics each having a majority ethnic group, (made) Yugoslavia seem a ticking time bomb that portended war and destruction.”[53] Religion is often cited as the wedge that divides the Albanians and Serbians in Kosovo and is the criteria on which the argument of ethnic conflict is made, with some arguing that the use of ‘othering’ in making Muslims in the Balkans seem ‘non-European’ is the cause of conflict.[54]. However, without the tools of excessive nationalism employed by the Serbian government, under Milosevic, in an attempt to exacerbate differences between groups, and use these differences to establish political control, it is quite possible that ethnic conflict could have been long avoided. While some argue that ethnic conflict will arise naturally out of difference, this paper suggests that ethnic conflict doesn’t emerge spontaneously but rather, that it is the result of conscious political decision making to use ethnic differences in an attempt to destabilize a region and gain outside political influence, a new and modern form of imperialism. Ethnic conflict is a political decision that is unbalanced and often grave in its consequences.



Ethnic Conflict And The Consequences For International Security

            The effects of the ethnic wars in Kosovo and Abkhazia have had both domestic and international ramifications. Whenever ethnic conflict is employed without check by other political powers, or when action is taken to stop ethnic conflict in a “too little too late” fashion, damage is inflicted that will affect not only the immediate region but, the world at large. One of the clear consequences of ethnic conflict is the massive loss of human life, as well as the huge flow of refugees.[55] It is estimated that 1.8 million ethnic Albanians had to flee Kosovo to escape the onslaught of Yugoslav and Serbian action over the decades of turmoil in the region.[56] In Abkhazia “the war resulted in changes of ethnic makeup…. Which is illegal under the Geneva Convention of 1949,” and also led to the abandonment of the area by “almost 80% of its civilian population.”[57] The wars in both Kosovo and Abkhazia have led to the destruction of towns, beautiful landscapes, economies, and any potential sources of tourism. The violence and lawlessness in these regions has also opened them up to the drug and weapons trade.[58] However, these are ramifications of ethnic violence that are rather confined. Massive flows of refugees can lead to processes of “ghettoization,” a known threat and cause of potential international security problems. Ethnic violence’s impact in creating hatred that can span generations, and spread across borders becomes all the more likely with the use of ethnic conflict as political violence. The formation of groups designed to combat their original persecutors can become groups that are terrorist organizations with no aim but violence, as can be seen with the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka.[59] The domestic and international consequences of ethnic violence as a political tool and form of new imperialism far outweigh the benefits, on both a practical and moral level. Universal human rights must not be violated in the name of political influence.



Abkhazia and Kosovo have been the sites of ambitious political projects of the Russian Federation and Serbia in the use of ethnic conflict as a political tool to gain influence in regions outside their direct control, equating a new form of imperialism. The reasons behind the political action of Russia in Abkhazia lay in developing domination over its former sphere of influence, lost when Georgia gained independence with the collapse of the USSR. Russia hopes that by stirring the ethnic tensions in Georgia it will be able to gain political influence over the area, and keep international interests and investment out of its “backyard.” In Kosovo, former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic used ethnic conflict to consolidate Serbian political control over the area, as well as to stir up excessive nationalism in Serbia to hide the devastating political and economic state the country was in. By employing propaganda, weapons, training, direct military involvement and financial support, both Russia and Serbia involved themselves in creating hatred and violence between ethnic groups. In their relative success in creating the ethnic cleansing experienced in the 1990’s in Abkhazia and Kosovo, the question must be asked whether or not the end justified the means. Were the political goals of Russia and Serbia met? In the case of Russia, Georgia was destabilized, but to what end did it matter, or was worth the casualties inflicted on the area? In Serbia the failure of ethnic conflict as a political tool is clear. While some suggest that ethnic conflict arises naturally out of differences between groups, it is obvious that ethnic differences are manipulated by outside powers to gain political influence in a form of new imperialism. However, the cost of these political actions has consequences both domestically and internationally. While ethnic conflict emerges as a tool of political manipulation, the international community must step in and stop such action, instead of hoping that such conflicts will resolve themselves, if for no other reason than the threat ethnic violence will eventually become a threat to international security, let alone the moral responsibility of the world to stop such wars.




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           Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.


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           Columbia University Press, 1998.


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           And Violence In The Former Yugoslavia. NewYork: Routledge, 2002.

[1] Franke Wilmer, The Social Construction Of Man, The State, And War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence In The Former Yugoslavia (New York: Routledge, 2002) 246.

[2] Helen Krag and Lars Funch, The North Caucasus: Minorities At A Crossroads  (London: Manchester Free Press, 2000)  24-25.              

[3] Krag, The North Caucasus, 19.

[4] Andrew Anderson,  Russia Versus Georgia: One Undeclared War In The Cauacuses, October 2001, <> (5 April 2003).

[5] Pal Kolsto, Political Construction Sites: National Building In Russia and The Post-Soviet States (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000) 238-240.

[6] Kolsto, Political Construction Sites, 70-71.

[7] Krag, The North Caucasus, 36. Michael Mandelbaum ed. The New European Diasporas: National Minorities And Conflict In Eastern Europe (New York: Council On Foreign Relations Press, 2000) 92-93.

[8] Kolsto, Political Construction Sites, 70-71.

[9] Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics Of Ethnic War. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001) 86-89.

[10] Krag, The North Caucasus, 30,36.

[11] Krag, The North Cauacasus, 35-36.

[12] Krag, The North Caucasus, 35-36.

[13] Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 87.

[14] Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) xviii-xix.

[15]Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo: How Myth’s and Truths Started A War (California: University of California Press, 1999) 316.

[16] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 146-147.

[17] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 147.

[18] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 241-247.

[19] Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension, (US: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 2002) 243-244.

[20] Taras Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 243-244.

[21] Mertus, Kosovo, 316.

[22] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[23] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[24] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[25] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[26] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[27] Krag, The North Caucasus, 27-28.

[28] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 149-151.

[29] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 227-230.

[30] Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 227-230.

[31] Miron Rezun, Europe’s Nightmare: The Struggle For Kosovo (Connecticut: Praeger, 2001) 43.

[32] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia: One Undeclared War In The Caucasus”

[33] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[34] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia,”  Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, 87.

[35] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[36] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[37] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[38] Vickers, Between Albanian and Serb, 241-245.

[39] Vickers, Between Albanian and Serb, 244-248.

[40] Wilmer, The Social Construction Of Man, The State, and War, 187-192.

[41] Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 243-244.

[42] Mandelbaum, The New European Diasporas 214-217.

[43] Tatiana Mastyugina and Lev Perpelkin, An Ethnic History of Russia: Pre-Revolutionary Times to the Present  Vitaly Naumkin and Irina Zviagelskaia eds., (US: Greenwood Press, 1996) 174-178

[44] Krag, The North Caucasus, 27-28.

[45] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia.”

[46] Taras  Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 243-244.

[47] Taraa, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 243-244.

[48] Rezun, Europe’s Nightmare, 17,41.

[49] Wilmer, The Social Construction Of Man, the State, and War, 246.

[50] Michael Rwykin, Moscow’s Lost Empire (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1994) 42-49.

[51] Rwykin, Moscow’s Lost Empire 145.

[52] Kolsto, Political Construction Sites, 70-72.

[53] Rezun, Europe’s Nightmare, 13.

[54] Joel M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel eds., Neighbors At War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture and History (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 2000) 118-121.

[55] Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 84.

[56] Rezun, Europe’s Nightmare, 2.

[57] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[58] Anderson, “Russia Versus Georgia”

[59] Taras, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 182-211


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