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Conflicts, Forecasts, the International Judiciary and Economic Aspects

Introduction

The idea of putting together a book similar to this monograph has long been around in the scholarly and political community of Georgia. In fact, this is due to several reasons, including Russia’s aggressive policies toward Georgia it pursued ever since dissolution of the Soviet Union, the instigated internal conflicts in the territory of Georgia,  violation of human rights in the two occupied - factually annexed - territories, and the lack of effective international involvement in regulating the mentioned conflicts. The present Monograph describes how  similar developments have evolved in other parts of the world over the recent decade. It analyses significant facts and processes bearing a relevance to Georgia and demonstrates what steps the relevant international organizations have taken so far to assist in resolving the conflicts and protecting human rights.
The Monograph contains an overview of the UN peacekeeping missions, their legal mandates and implementation examples, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, as well as the structure of organizations called to protect human rights, particularly, the UN and European Courts, together with their main areas of competence and specifics. This is the first Georgian-language publication comprising an account of the international case law relating to the Cyprus-Greece, Moldova-Russia, Russia-Chechnya relationships and developments in Rwanda; The Kosovo developments have been addressed only to a length relevant to Georgia; A special chapter deals with the economic aspects of conflict settlement.
The authors believe that a due account to the above issues in making conclusions, as well as drawing parallels and identifying similarities with the developments in Georgia, is crucial to the resolution of this country’s main problem – restoration of its territorial integrity. The Monograph  considers the issue of restoration of territorial integrity both from the standpoint of reinstating Georgia’s jurisdiction in the uncontrolled territories and safeguarding the universally shared system of democratic and humanitarian values.
First and foremost, conflict situations are known to affect human rights and freedoms, together with bringing about economic plight. Hence, the book’s focus is not only on how international courts and other international organizations deal with the violations of human rights and freedoms, but also on a novel approach to the economic aspects of conflicts that are of no less importance. The authors’ position regarding resolution of conflicts can in a nutshell be expressed as a tenet “the product from the conflict zone”. The approach accentuates the need for implementation of integrated projects, as opposed to a general economic rehabilitation. The  program called “The Product from the Conflict Zone” aims to restore trust between the opposing groups of population through economic cooperation, which will, in turn, expedite the integration of conflict zones’ population into the Georgian state. The approach is versatile and, hence, applicable  to conflict settlement in other countries.
We believe that the present book will be of interest to a wide circle of readers and scholars, far beyond the scope of those solely working on problems specific to Georgia.

Summary
Chapter 1, “UN and Peacekeeping Operations”, features the  main substance, goals and objectives of peacekeeping. This is a notion defined as a method for the provision of assistance to countries that have suffered from a conflict, with a view to reaching peace and setting conditions for its maintenance. UN peacekeepers – soldiers, officers, civilian police and civilian personnel from many countries of the world – control and monitor peace processes in post-conflict areas, and help ex-combatants fulfil obligations taken under the signed peace agreements. Such an assistance may come in various forms, including the support of confidence-building measures, joint discharge of governance functions, helping with holding elections, strengthening the law and order, facilitating social and economic development, etc.
Peacekeeping forces have first come to the scene in 1948 as a reconciliation mission in the first UN- supervised operation.
According to the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is authorized and responsible for undertaking collective measures aimed at supporting international peace and security. Therefore, the actions of the international community are normally based on the principle that the conduct of peacekeeping operations should be sanctioned by the UN Security Council.  The majority of such operations are designed and effected by the UN itself, with troops acting under its direct operational leadership. In other cases,  however, where the UN deems its direct involvement unjustified or inexpedient, the Council tasks the regional organizations - such as the North-Atlantic Alliance, Economic Community of West African States, or other coalitions of countries willing to shoulder some peacekeeping or peace-building functions - to conduct such operations.
The experiences gained by the UN observer forces  in the course of operations aimed at separating hostile forces in Cyprus in 1964, coupled with the operational effectiveness of the United Nations special peacekeeping forces’ Emergency Force II  in 1973, have laid foundation for the elaboration of a number of fundamental principles underlying the UN peace support operations. In particular:
- Support by the Security Council;
1.     as sanctioned  by the UN Security Council,  led and controlled by the UN General Secretary on behalf of the UN;
2.     troops shall be manned by servicemen from small- and medium-size countries, which practically allowed to rule out involvement of permanent members of the Security Council in the peacekeeping operations during the cold war period.
-    The use of weapons solely for self-defence while fulfilling the mandate, in the event of armed resistance
-     Impartiality

The peacekeeping forces have saved a lot of lives. On numerous occasions, these forces provided a valuable help in securing peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations  and setting necessary conditions for the fulfilment of agreements reached by confronting parties under the supervision of peacekeepers.
The Monograph tracks the dynamics of UN peacekeeping operations and demonstrates their changeable character. In particular, it features the radical change in the mode of peacekeeping operations which occurred in 1987, following the expansion of the scale of operations beyond the traditional model of observing seize-fires and force separations. This period was marked with the introduction of a peace-building element into the operations (e.g., neutralizing mines in Cambodia), together with the humanitarian relief (Somali and Bosnia). Civilians played a vitally important part in the UN operations in Namibia, Salvador and Cambodia, performing a variety of tasks,  from public administration and observing elections to investigation into human rights violations.
The Book states that peacekeeping functions have not been clearly spelled out in the UN Charter, for the simple reason that back in 1945, when the UN was established, nobody could possibly foresee there would be any need for such operations in future. One commonly shared belief of that time was that the world’s five great powers - China, USSR, UK, USA and France – together could deter or restrain any conflict nearly anywhere. However, the ensuing period proved otherwise. Hence, it became necessary to take other methods on board.
As such, peace support operations were ‘born’ with the setting up of the United Nations Emergency Force during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. From that time on, there have been the total of thirty peace support operations conducted in various parts of the world.
The end of cold war triggered a radical change in the mode of peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN on multilateral basis. Making use of the newly emerged environment for collaboration, the Security Council endorsed wider and more complex peace missions, often aimed at helping the main opposing sides in internal conflicts to reach an all-embracing peace accord. In 1992, with a view to meeting the growing demand for comprehensive peace operations, the UN established the Peace Support Department. The book includes description of the functions and structure of  this department.
The Monograph contains an account of accomplished (Mozambique, Salvador, Somali, Cambodia) and successful peace missions (Salvador, Mozambique, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Timor L’Este (former East Timor), Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia). It is noted that some of the UN missions have failed due to an over-enthusiastic assessment of the potential of peacekeeping operations: for instance, in Somali a seize-fire could not be achieved, nor was it possible to secure consent of all involved parties for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The manning of the operation was insufficient. Moreover, no political will was demonstrated to resolve the conflict, which made it impossible to perform the mandate properly and duly. A series of disfunctionalities - the most painful of which were the 1996 mass killings in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda - urged the UN to embark on a serious reorganization work and undertake a self-analysis.
In 1999, based on the comprehensive analysis of the tragedies in Srebrenica and Rwanda, Kofi Annan arrived at the conclusion that the UN peacekeeping activities were to be thoroughly reformed. He ordered an independent investigation to study the activities of the UN in the course of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The obtained findings clearly demonstrated the need for enhancing the UN peacekeeping capacity. The report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known as Brahimi report, provides clear-cut recommendations,  setting minimum requirements for a successful conduct of the UN peace missions. The reports  underscored the importance of clear and credible mandates, together with need to secure the consent of conflicting parties for the conduct of the UN peace operations and provision of adequate resources.
Based on this report, the UN and its member-countries effected a number of measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the UN peace operations. The UN Department for Peace Keeping Operations  was tasked to increase its headquarters staffing in  support of field missions. The Department enlarged its Military and Civilian Police Advisers’ Division. Apart from this, it launched the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, charged with analyzing the accumulated experiences and providing recommendations to the UN missions on such matters as: general issues, peacekeepers’ code of conduct, disarmament, planning demobilization and reintegration programs, keeping the law and order, etc.
On 20 December 2005, the parallel sessions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council endorsed the resolution on the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This new intergovernmental advisory body is called to provide a post-conflict recovery assistance and mobilize resources to this end.
In our view, of particular interest to the reader will be the deliberations regarding the UN peace mission in Kosovo. The more so that Georgia’s opponents are now attempting to apply Kosovo’s precedent to the current conflicts in this country.
In Kosovo, regardless the  large scale and complex structure of the conflict, the UN opted for an unprecedented and daring experiment. Not a single UN mission in the preceding period has ever engaged other multilateral organizations as full-fledged partners in the peace operations held under the UN auspices.
 
The peace mission in Kosovo was endorsed on 10 June 1999, when the UN Security Council passed resolution #1244 and authorized the UN Secretary General to establish the UN-led Interim Civil Administration in the war-torn Kosovo. Under its leadership, the Kosovo population  could gradually start exercising the rights of a virtual autonomy. Specifically, through resolution #1244, the Security Council charged the mission with the following tasks:
    perform basic civilian administrative functions;
    promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
    facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status;
    coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies;
    support the reconstruction of key infrastructure;
    maintain civil law and order;
    promote human rights; and
    assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

Having enlisted the help of Kosovo’s leadership and population, the mission shouldered the task of implementing essential administrative functions and services, encompassing such areas as healthcare, education, banking system and finances, postal services and communication, and maintenance of civil law and order.
•    In January 2000, various departments of the joint administrative structure were formed. In October 2000, 30 municipalities of Kosovo held local elections; May 2001 saw adoption of Kosovo’s new constitutional frameworks.
With a view to fulfilling its mandate, the UN mission in Kosovo took control of four areas, in other words ”pillars”, of administration. Pillar 1 (humanitarian relief) – led by the Office Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was launched upon completion of the emergency stage and phased out by June 2000. In May 2001, a new Pillar 1 was introduced. Presently, there are the following pillars:
    Police and justice, under the United Nations,
    Civil administration, under the United Nations,
    Democratisation and institution-building, led by the Organization for Security, and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
    Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union.

The Head of UNMK is a special representative of the UN Secretary General. He controls and oversees the progress of work undertaken by the above four pillars and facilitates the political processes leading to determination of Kosovo’s political status.
On 10 December 2003, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Holkery, officially voiced his plan known as “Standards for Kosovo”. This document is an important landmark towards securing compliance with the eight standards for Kosovo that should be met infallibly prior to consideration of the issue of Kosovo’s status.
The Reader will also find the citing of ten guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo. This latter, de jure being a part of Serbia has been under UN administration since 1999. So far, the negotiations aimed at determining Kosovo’s status in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, remain largely unsuccessful. This year alone, there were four summit meetings held with the mediation of the UN Special Envoy for Future Status Process in Kosovo, Martti Antisaari, former President of Finland. Sadly, all of these meetings were in vain.
The Albanian side sets forth a categorical ultimatum for independence, while the Serb leadership rules out such a possibility totally and completely. At negotiations, the Serb side expressed its readiness to grant Kosovo a broad autonomy within Serbia’s borders that would be guaranteed by a special constitutional agreement.
According to the suggested agreement, Serbia is prepared to delegate the local legislative, executive and judiciary authority to Kosovo, with Belgrade retaining foreign policy and border protection functions.

In addition, in the course of negotiations, the heads of Serbian delegation, President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, circulated among the foreign ministers of the member-countries of the Kosovo Contact Group (USA, Germany, Russia, Italy, France and UK) and to Marti Antisaari,  a document containing proposals for further negotiations.
The circulated document suggests that the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina should concentrate on four major issues:
1.    Elaboration of the new constitution of Kosovo
2.    Security of Kosovo’s Serbian population
3.    Economic and financial relations
4.    Decentralization of the province

The Security Council and the UN General Assembly have considered the issue of Kosovo’s status at their sessions but have failed to come at any concerted decision.
On February 14 this year, Serbia’s Skupcina, by the absolute majority of votes (225 against 15, with 3 abstained), endorsed a government-submitted draft resolution fully rejecting the basic provisions of the plan set forth by M. Antisaari, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General,  on February 2.
The Serbian MPs dismissed M. Antisaari’s major principles  as totally illegitimate, as they speak about according all essential attributes of an independent statehood to Kosovo, also leaving certain elements of international protectorate.
The Resolution points out that ‘Antisaari’s plan’ violates the basic principles of international law, disregards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia as regards Kosovo and Metohija, and paves the way for an illegitimate establishment of a new independent state inside the territory of Serbia. This ‘imposed independence’ of the province, the MPs’ contend, will be fraught with unforeseeable consequences. They caution that the virtual independence of Kosovo will create "an exceptionally dangerous precedent for resolving minority issues and territorial disputes throughout Europe and the world ".  “Such an outcome would destabilize the situation in the region for the long term, and cloud the European prospects of the entire Western Balkans”. Serbia’s National Assembly called on all countries and international organizations to stand up to the threat to Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and reject any imposed solution regarding Kosovo.
Russia’s position in respect to Kosovo’s status was made crystal-clear both by President Putin and Minster of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lavrov. This position is fully reflected in a document, called “On Russia’s Position at the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly” placed on the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The document states that the decision regarding Kosovo’s status should be universal and precedental by nature;
Earlier on, (September 2006),  V. Putin elaborated on the expediency of applying the international standards, similar to those used with respect to Serbia-Kosovo, to the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts in the territory of Georgia. In his view,  the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by international community, will knock off any grounds from under non-recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence. At the same time, V. Putin noted he would not rule out that Russia would use its veto right during the voting on Kosovo’s status at the UN Security Council.
The US and Western countries have a different position about this issue. They talk about the unique nature of the Kosovo issue and note the specificities of the conflict, pointing out in how different it is from other conflicts.
In response to Russian politicians’ attempts to artificially inflate the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts in parallel with Kosovo and insisting upon applying the same common and universal approaches to these conflicts, the authors point out the distinctions between the Georgian and Yugoslavian (Kosovo) conflicts which make them totally different in nature.
In the view of the Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia, drawing parallels between the actions of the governments of Georgia and Yugoslavia is an out-of-place and nonsensical exercise. Neither would it be appropriate to speak about similarities between these conflicts due to the following reason: the majority of Kosovo’s population is Albanian (77% of Albans, and 13% - Serbs), and this majority has expressly manifested its support of independence. By comparison, holding any opinion polls in connection with determination of Abkhazia’s status would totally be devoid of any sense, as the majority of population have been ousted from this territory (This opinion is unequivocally supported by the European Union).
Yet another important circumstance should be mentioned here. As is well known, the majority of the present population in Abkhazia and Ossetia have been granted the Russian citizenship. Under such conditions, participation of the persons that  are citizens of one country in a referendum on the independence of territories in another country is a juridical nonsense.  No such examples can be found in the world practice.
It is commonly known that there was a genocide of the Albanian population in Kosovo, while in Abkhazia, it was the Georgian population that fell victim to the genocide and ethnic cleansing. Until now, Russia undertakes permanent attempts to annex the territory, a fact corroborated by a number of reputable international organizations.
At OSCE meetings, the member countries have more than once raised concerns about the ethnic cleansing of Georgians, their mass expulsion from the places of their residence, and the killings of a large number of the civilian population (Resolution of 6 December 1994 of the OSCE Budapest Meeting ; OSCE Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2-3 December 1996; OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration of 19 November 1999).
And still, the major difference lies in the fact that in case of Yugoslavia the Serbian-Albanian confrontation was only too evident, while the conflicts in this country hardly bear the nature of a direct Georgian–Ossetian or Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation. Rather, what we see in the latter case is Russia’s outright aggression  against Georgia.
A separate chapter is devoted to a brief review of Yugoslavia’s history, in particular: creation of the Yugoslav statehood and the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia, confrontation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, protestations in the country over the status of the Yugoslav Republic, as well as referendums on the independence held in the constituent republics and the Dayton Agreement.
On 28 September 1995, at the Wright-Patterson air force base, near Dayton (State of Ohio), USA, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement), with its  11 annexes, was initialled with the participation of representatives of the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian conflicting parties.
Upon its signing in Paris on 14 December 1995, the enforced agreement envisioned establishment of a joint state consisting of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the confines of the 1990 borders. The Republic was to consist of two parts – the Serb Republic and Muslim Croat Federation.   
Conditionally, the Agreement could be split into two parts: a set of military questions and problems related to the civilian settlement. It provided for stationing a large, 60-thousand-strong NATO contingent in the Bosnian territory with a view to observing the seize-fire, with American servicemen amounting to almost half the number of troops. Apart from this, the post of High Representative of the International Community was introduced, whose  wide competencies are indicative of nothing short of the establishment of an international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The Book points out that the Dayton Agreement was most instrumental in stopping the bloodshed brought about by ethnic confrontation. The NATO troops managed to separate the conflicting forces, enabling a part of displaced persons to return to their homes. Over recent years, the country has made a certain headway in the political and social sphere.  Bosnia and Herzegovina are now going through a constitutional reform, parallel to the ongoing integration process into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Although, in the opinion of international experts, this latter process falls behind the respective rate of development of interrelationships between Brussels and other Balkan countries.

Similar to the other Eastern European nations, Serbian people failed to build a true democratic society over the period of 1945-1990, as they were clutched in the grips of one-party dictatorship and one overarching ideology. All of these countries were ruled by a hypertrophic central power.
In truth, despite the formally declared ‘people’s power’, Yugoslavia  was fully subject to the dictatorship of the ruling party, having zero tolerance for any discording of opinion. The ethnic issue was pronounced as finally resolved, although, in fairness, there were numerous gross violations from the interethnic relations viewpoint. Hence, the authors conclude that the outbreak of nationalism in that country was the price it paid for the many years of dictatorship. After the death of Joseph Broz Tito who ruled with a firm feast and managed to maintain social order and relative integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over four decades, the strive for independence amongst the republics that constituted the Federation and the weakening of the centre became particularly prominent.
According to the author, one of the primary reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia was  an extremely uneven  level of economic development of the constituent republics.
The Monograph  also comprises deliberations on the topic of the Hague  International Court and the Hague International Tribunal.
As is well known, 27 February 2006 saw the commencement of unprecedented hearings at Hague: for the first time in history, individual countries – rather than citizens - acted both as the plaintiff and the respondent.
Bosnia and Herzegovina accused Serbia and Montenegro of the breach of the Convention for the Prevention War Crimes in 1992-1995 and of the genocide and ethnic cleansing committed against the non-Serbian population, which claimed the heavy toll of 100,000 lives.
Despite the fact that the complaints were lodged as early as 1993, the judges were able to commence the hearing of this complex case only in 2006. This has been the first litigation initiated by one former Yugoslav republic against the other.

As to the Hague Tribunal, established in connection with former Yugoslavia, in total, from its inception until now, it delivered judgements on 16 individuals. In January 2004, the Hague International Tribunal issued an arrest warrant for another 12 persons charged with war crimes.
According to the most recent information, the Tribunal has issued indictments on 125 persons, out of which 16 are still absconding justice. The  best known figures among these are President Slobodan Milosevic and sixteen other influential political and military  leaders of former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs leader, former president Radovan Karaciç and the Serbian army commander Ratko Mladić.
On 10 July 2006, the Hague Tribunal began one of the most resonating litigations over its history, with six former leaders of Serbia and the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia behind the bar,  including the former president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic.
 
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Chapter 3 of the Book deals with the topic of armed conflicts in the  post-Soviet space.
The end of cold war, together with the demise of totalitarian communist regimes and collapse of the socialist system in the 80’s and 90’s of the 20th century, resulted in a major redesign of the world’s political spectrum.
Former soviet republics expressly demonstrated their aspiration toward building their respective independent statehoods.
This period was also marked by the emergence of separatists sentiments, inspired by the former centre, which in a number of locations manifested the tendency towards growing into regional conflicts (Transdniestria, Abkhazia, former South Ossetian Oblast, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast).
Notably, all four leaders of the rebellious regions were members of the ’Sojuz’ faction of the Council of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, they were string-manipulated from the centre.

The authors hold that, despite the varying forms, these conflicts are identical in substance. They analyse the root-causes of the conflicts and draw distinctions between their three types: a) conflicts inspired by self-determination demands of ethnic minorities; 2) conflicts related to the re-distribution of the former USSR property; and, finally,  c) conflicts that have acquired the character of a civil war.
As a rule, conflicts driven by demands for self-determination and the re-tailoring of administrative borders, have been found to evolve three major stages. First, there comes a relatively peaceful stage, characterized by a growing ’war of laws’ between the central authorities and the political elite of the ethnic minorities, demanding  wider political and economic freedoms. Typically, neither of the sides is flexible enough to reach an accord or come to a compromise. For instance, in the mid-perestroika period, Nagorny Karabakh’s Armenian population, set forth a petition to the Azerbaijan government claiming a broad national and territorial autonomy,  also implying the possibility of acceding to Armenia.
Seeing these claims as a real threat of separatism, including a possible break-away of the Armenian part of the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, the Azerbaijani leadership, categorically refused to consider the demand and attempted to settle the problem forcefully.
The Supreme Council of the Armenian Republic  and the National Council of the Nagorny Karabakh adopted a joint decision declaring the accession of Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia. The decision came in response to the adoption by Azerbaijan of the Law on Sovereignty, according to which Nagorny Karabakh, together with the rest of Azerbaijan, could pull out from the USSR any moment in time.
The above decision turned out to serve as a prologue to an open armed confrontation.
Developments in Moldova evolved by a similar scenario. The Supreme Council of the self-proclaimed republic of Transdniestria presented numerous proposals to the Parliament of Moldova to sign a federative constitutional agreement. As the proposals were rejected,  the representatives of Transdniestria refused  to participate in the work of the parliament to demonstrate their protest. In the following period, Transdniestria issued a number of laws directly conflicting with Moldova’s acting constitution. This entailed  reciprocal steps on the part of the country’s leadership, expressed in a consistent dismissal of these laws as illegitimate.
A similar ‘war of laws’ scenario was played with respect to the so-called South Ossetia. Perestroika sparked off a growing movement for independence statehood in the majority of Soviet republics, including Georgia. As a counter measure, the Kremlin resorted to fanning the flames of separatist sentiments. Such sentiments aspiring to achieve a maximal autonomy from Georgia were basically prevalent among Ossetia’s  political elite.
As a rule, in each case the ‘war of laws’ was waged in parallel with the introduction of economic sanctions, the orchestrated subversive activities and terrorist acts, all of these contributing to the spilling of the existent confrontation into an armed conflict.
As a chain reaction, a fight unleashed by one national minority was added to by unrests stirred among other minorities. In Moldova, Transdniestria’a movement for autonomy was bolstered by the protestations of gagauzs residing to the south of Moldova. Similar to this, in Georgia, the Abkhazs started setting forth  their own demands for broader rights, thus backing up the protestations of the South Ossetian Oblast.
The second stage of this type of conflict involves an armed confrontation. Normally, at this stage, the conflicting parties undertake attempts to internationalize the conflict and call on their potential allies for help or mediation. At the same time they do all they can to denigrate one another in the eyes of the international community. In every instance, each side harboured an illusory hope that it would soon gain a major military victory, which pushed the situation further into a deadlock, leaving little room for peaceful negotiations.
Another feature typical of all conflicts in the CIS space was that prior to major talks each conflicting party tried to grab control over as much territory as possible, so that it could sit at the negotiation table comfortably cushioned by the head-start gained in such a way.
Hence, the development of conflicts into an armed confrontation stage did nothing to expedite the settlement of these conflicts. On the contrary,  it added on the gruesome “burden” of more mutual claims, hurt feelings, grave confrontations, and new scores to settle.
Stage 3 – de-escalation of conflicts on the basis of seize-fire agreements.
For a number of reasons, the end of hostilities has brought about no final and comprehensive settlement of the conflicts until now. Unfortunately, the attained peace is very fragile, while the root causes and political discordances that had led to the conflicts remain largely unresolved.
So far, no solution has been found to the problem of  safe return of refugees and IDPs to their home places. This fact accounts for the existence of a large category of people which,  sooner or later, may turn into a serious political force that could trigger a new wave of tensions in the region.
Such a course of events indicates to  the fact that despite the many efforts of the international and regional conflict-resolution organizations, their effectiveness remains disappointingly low. This is particularly evident in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazian conflicts.
Property-redistribution related conflicts are potentially linked to the disagreements over quotas for the redistribution of the former USSR property. The most illustrative example of such is the conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet.
The first stage of the conflict emerged in July 1990, straight after Ukraine’s declaration of independence. Ukraine’s political argumentation in the dispute was based on the premise that the republic’s share in the former USSR national income equalled about 25%, while the Black Sea fleet accounted only for 9.2% of the entire USSR fleet. Besides, 44% of all the Black Sea fleet ships had been built in Ukraine. Russia, on its part, maintained that it was entitled to 78% of  all the Black Sea fleet ships, while Ukraine could only claim 22%. As the tensions escalated, Ukraine resorted to a number of attempts that were, in effect, aimed at gaining control over the entire Black See fleet. From January 1992, without any prior agreement with the Russian Defence Ministry, Ukraine started financing the entire fleet unilaterally. It was only after rounds of arduous negotiations,  that a solution was reached by which both the countries would allocate equal sums from their budgets to finance the fleet.
This decision provided a headway for the transfer of the conflict into the second stage, where disputes over the Black Sea fleet were put into the frameworks of agreements. The peace accord achieved in Dagomyss on 22 July 1992, provided for a transition period for the division of the fleet to cover the period until 1995, however the agreement contained no indication of the major issue, as to what mechanism would be used in the division process.  What’s more, certain decision dragged the situation further into a stalemate. Without resolving the issue of the fleet’s status, it was decided that its Commander would be appointed by the mutual agreement by the two Presidents and would take orders both form the Russian and Ukrainian President. Besides, the parties made a decision on the establishment of a joint commission with a view to overseeing the implementation of the Yalta Agreement, comprising members of Russia’s, Ukraine’s and Crimea’s Supreme Councils and the Sevastopol Municipality Council, which largely remained unaffected.
Another subject of contention  between Russia and Ukraine was a dispute  over Crimea, which  back in January-February 1954, was pulled out from the Russian Federation and adjoined to Ukraine.
Stage 3 of the conflicts – civil war.
A telling example of this conflict stage has been the civil war in Tajikistan. Its root cause of  was an increasingly high confrontation between the many political forces in the country, representing various social layers (tribes, local clans, etc.).
A political compromise turned out practically impossible, which led to an armed confrontation. The first telling sign of a starting civil war was the beginning of armed clashes between the armed formations legally subordinated to different political forces, followed by a gradual escalation of fights over time.

The traditional antagonism was further exacerbated by a region-to-region  confrontment and the class dissent between the old forces (the so-called ‘party nomenclature’)  and the representatives of a new political movement waging the war under the Islamic Revival flag. Apparently, it will take decades of politicians’ and diplomats’ self-devoted efforts to undo this intricately woven bundle of problems.
Understandably, the Monograph gives a great deal of attention to the conflicts that emerged in Georgia in the early 90’s. It views the root causes of the conflicts through the prism of the highly complicated history of Russian-Georgia relations, also devoting ample attention to the consideration of the evolution of conflicts, progress of peace processes and the mistakes made in their course. In this connection, the authors suggest a tool to activate the above processes.
The Monograph speculates on the major impact Georgia’s geographic location spanning over its entire history and development, and determining the country’s major cultural and historical mission in the Caucasus.
Historically, no country with any strength and imperial ambitions was ever able by–pass the Caucasus  if, indeed, it aspired to become an empire. It aspired to consolidate its borders  in the Caucasus or, better even, across the Caucasus. Naturally, in either instance, it came head-to-head with Georgia, the central country in the region.
Last aggressor that subjugated the Caucasus insistently and step-by-step, was the Russian Empire. Its tireless attempts to conquer the Caucasus span over the period of more than two centuries. This plan was implemented methodically and consistently.
The main strategies employed by Russia to gain control over Georgia were based upon the following factors:    
1.    Internal factor – the region being a melting pot of a great number of ethnicities and religions, which offered considerable chances to stir internal contradictions.
2.    External factor – a frantic confrontment between Iran and the Ottoman Empire over the Caucasus and their century-long fight, which finally - along with the domestic reasons - significantly weakened the two countries, leaving them outside the playfield of big geopolitical games for a lengthy time;
3.    A plan to turn Georgia into the gendarme of the Caucasus - a total and complete contradiction with the historical role/mission of this country;
4.    Demographic expansion

The Monograph describes how the Russian Empire proceeded along these strategic lines and what techniques it had used starting from the 18th century until now.  
To a certain degree, Russia succeeded in reversing the positive energy expended into the building of the Common Caucasus Home to a negative charge, by purposefully embroiling North Caucasians in the conflict it instigated in Abkhazia. Prior to that, it orchestrated the toppling down of the Georgian government that came to power democratically in 1991-1992.
Importantly, apart from geopolitical interests, the engagement of North Caucasians into the Abkhazian conflict by Russia pursued yet another, insidious goal. More specifically, this exercise was meant to divert the North Caucasians’ attention from their own problems onto Georgia.
It is well known that in the early 90’s, against the backdrop of growing religious and national identity sentiments in North Caucasus, the level of unemployment among the youth was particularly high. Social problems served a feeding ground for the ripening of ethnic confrontation between representatives of various ethnic groups. The increasing dissatisfaction with the existing situation inevitably lead to an escalation of tensions and eventual confrontation with the centre. Under these circumstances, with a view to camouflaging the existing problems and avoiding the need to address them, the Russian authorities did all in their power to ensure that the accumulated negative energy vented onto Georgia.

The authors note that during the Soviet period separatism movement in Abkhazia was acquiring an organized form. An extremely sharp episode of exacerbation of the Georgian-Abkhaz relations coincides with the adoption of the 1977 Constitution. The confrontation occurred around the issue of Abkhazia’s status.
The onset of ‘perestroika’ processes back in 1985, enabled Georgia to openly launch the national liberation movement for the its independence.
A new, decisive stage of this movement in the country began in 1988. Unsurprisingly, the same period was marked by intensification of separatists movements inspired by the Centre. Their first serious manifestation was the “Abkhaz letter’ addressed to the 1st All-Union Conference of the Communist Party.
This show of separatist sentiments reached its peak with the gathering of the Abkhaz population in v. Lykhni, Gudauta district, on 18 March 1989, which adopted an address to the leadership of the Soviet Union fully permeated with anti-Georgian rhetoric. This, in truth, was a petition to decede from Georgia. Soon, there followed provocations of blood-shedding attacks on Georgians (1-2 April 1989, 15-16 July 1989).
In order to keep the heat of the exacerbated confrontation with the Georgian population, Moscow’s special services aided and financed the setting up of  a number of anti-Georgian organizations, such as “Aidgilara”, “Slavjanski do”, “Krounk” and “Alan”.


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The situation in the South Ossetian Oblast became tense when its local authorities passed a decision on the assignment of a higher status to the autonomous oblast on 10 November 1989, proclaiming the transformation of the oblast into the Soviet democratic republic and declaring its sovereignty.
Similar processes were also underway in Abkhazia. In the early 90’s, through a gross violation of the law, the Abkhaz separatists adopted a resolution  “On Legal Guarantees for the Protection of Akhazia’s Statehood”, coupled with “The declaration on the state sovereignty of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Republic”.
Apparently, all these steps by separatists and their accomplices, were targeted at provoking larger clashes against the Georgian people. In the end, Georgia was dragged into a most severe, lengthy  and blood-shedding war raging in  its two provinces – all of this was aimed at stifling Georgia’s aspirations towards independence. The conflicts took a heavy toll of casualties, including thousands of dead, tens of thousands  of wounded, over 300,000 displaced persons, tens of thousands of destroyed houses, accompanied by destruction of material and cultural artefacts. In effect, by using the Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists as a cat’s paw and engaging its own regular forces  in decisive moments of battles, Russia committed an act of actual occupation and annexation of Georgia.
The ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Georgian population is  still continuing. However, the Georgian government has not abandoned its efforts to settle the conflicts peacefully. On 24 July 1992, in Dagomyss (Russia) an agreement was signed “On the Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict”, which  resulted in the setting up and stationing of tripartite peace-keeping forces (Russia, Georgia, and Northern Ossetia) on the ground.
On 4 April 1994, a quadripartite agreement on “Voluntary Return of Refugees and IDPs from Abkhazia” was signed in Moscow, together with a release of a statement “On the Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict”.
On 14 May 1994, with the mediation of the Russian Federation, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed an agreement on ceasefire and separation of forces. On 24 July 1994, CIS collective peace-keeping forces (1600 servicemen and ammunition) entered the conflict zone.
Disrespecting the peace negotiations conducted so far, on 24 November 1994, the Abkhaz side adopted the so-called constitution of the Abkhaz Republic, declaring Abkhazia a sovereign state.
 On 19 January 1996, the Moscow CIS Summit adopted a decision  “On the Measures for Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia”. The document denounces the destructive stance of the Abkhaz side, holding it responsible for dragging-out the political settlement process, along with the safe return of IDPs to their homes.
Georgia enjoys an unequivocal support of the international community. Attesting to this are the many documents adopted by the UN, OSCE, EU which reconfirm Georgia’s territorial integrity and condemn the ethnic cleansing.
Although donned in the cloak of a peacekeeper, the Russian government, holding a dominance position in the post-Soviet space, has never taken  a single realistic step toward a true resolution of conflicts. On the contrary, it has offered and is still offering a fierce resistance to the Government of Georgia, by taking a clear-cut anti-Georgian stance at international organizations. This is manifested in the non-observance  of the documents that truly aim at settlement of the conflicts. For instance, according to paragraph 27.3 of Chapter 5 of the UN Charter, the Security Council adopts decisions on all matters by affirmative vote of its nine members, including all permanent members of the Council.   At the same time, pursuant to Chapter 4, paragraph 52. 3, the member that is party to the dispute in question should abstain from participating in the voting. In order to enable this provision, the Russian Federation must be officially recognized as a party to the conflict. To achieve this, Georgia needs the support of international organizations and certain states. In view of the above, the Georgian government deems it crucially important to boost the role of these latter, together with changing the format of peacekeeping operations and conducting negotiations directly with the Abkhaz side, as an essential prerequisite for the commencement of the settlement process.
The provided  examples of conflicts allow to single out the basic preconditions for conflict resolution:
1. Stop combat activities and restrain conflicting parties
2. Achieve a peace agreement; determine the subject of the conflict; determine the status.
The authors set forth the basic goals corresponding to each stage. In particular:
-    unconditional non-resumption of fire and stopping hostilities, disarming and disbanding confronting parties’ paramilitary formations;
-    withdrawing all military units from the conflict zone and from all neighbouring countries participating in the combat activities, including volunteer formations.
-    unconditional release of all hostages; bringing to justice all instigators of the armed conflict and perpetrators of criminal acts.
-    unblocking all transport and rail road routes;
-    delivering humanitarian relief to the population in the conflict zone;
-    maintain and strengthen the law and order through cooperation of the police services of the parties
-    safe return of refugees and IDPs to their homes under guarantees and supervision of the respective international organizations
-     holding elections
-    rehabilitation of the main infrastructure facilities, residential buildings and economy on the whole;

The main goal of Stage 2 is determination of the status through application of universally recognized principles of the international law.
***

Chapter 4 of the publication deals with the international structures working in the field of human rights protection, including their respective scopes of competence and specificities.
By joining the Council of Europe in April 1999  and ratifying the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in May of the same year, Georgia has officially recognized the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which acts as the guarantor of the observance of rights and freedoms spelled out in the Convention.

The fact that the breakaway regions remain outside the factual jurisdiction  of the Georgian state renders the country incapable of ensuring protection of human rights through domestic remedies in respect to the citizens that reside in those territories. Hence, the most efficient instrument for reinstatement of their abused rights is the application to the European Court of Human Rights. Its judgments on a number of cases serve as guiding benchmarks for Georgia. It is for this reason exactly that the Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia prepared two draft resolutions, unanimously approved at the plenary session of Georgia’s parliament on 17 March 2006.
Ratification of the European Convention for Human Rights affords every individual under its jurisdiction an opportunity to apply to the Strasbourg Court to ensure restoration of his/her violated rights. The analysis and generalization of the international court practice suggests that Georgia should take necessary steps in order to lodge a complaint against Russia with the United Nations International Court of Justice for the violations it committed in the conflict regions of Georgia.
The conflicts that emerged in Georgia in early 90’s, resulted in the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population, which was reflected in the respective documents of a number of international organizations. At the OSCE meeting, the participating countries expressed their deep concern over the ethnic cleansing  and mass expulsion of citizens - predominantly Georgians - from places of their residence, as well as the killing of a large number of civilians. On 21 February 2006, the country  presiding over European  Union  made a statement on EU’s behalf in connection to Georgia. The statement was joined practically by all European countries, except Russia and Belarus.  
The Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia, deems it necessary to establish an ad hoc working group in order to intensify work with the Baltic countries, Turkey - as a neighbouring country, Ukraine, Poland and others, to ensure the recognition of the fact of annexation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali by Russia. All of these countries have one feature in common. They are all embroiled in disputes with Russia as Soviet Union’s legal successor, whereas Georgia’s claim to Russia relates to the developments that occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

***
Bringing all crime perpetrators to justice is an essential precondition for conflict resolution and restoration of trust. Therefore, Georgia deems it necessary to pose the issue of establishment of an international tribunal for prosecution of violators of the international law in the territory of Abkhazia, both with the UN and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
Presently, as universally known, there are international  tribunals, established by the Security Council,  for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Not so long ago,  the idea of establishing an international tribunal for crimes committed in Chechnya was debated most actively. In 2003, The Council of Europe applied to the United Nations with a request  to look into the issue of creating an international tribunal for Chechnya.
Apparently, bringing violators of the international criminal law before international criminal courts is a much simpler undertaking compared to the establishment of international tribunals, requiring a special decision of the Security Council. An international court is a permanent body whose jurisdiction allows prosecution of physical persons for serious crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression crimes.
On 17 July 1998, the Statute of the International Criminal Court was signed in Rome. The Georgian parliament ratified the Statute on July 2003.
***
   
Given the above, a considerable attention is given to the overview of the case law precedents, presented in the form of court judgments. Each case has a relevance to the steps that Georgia is  about to take, in as much as they can serve as guiding benchmarks of principle importance.
The book draws an example of the 18 December 1996 judgement of European Court of Human Rights’ on the Loizidou against Turkey case. This many-year long litigation set one of the most illustrative and positive precedents in the international law. A citizen of the Republic of Cyprus, Titina Loizidou, who claimed that she had lost the right of access and enjoyment of her property following occupation of the northern  part of the country by Turkey, won the case. As a result, the respondent party, Turkey, had to pay Mrs. Loizidou a substantial monetary compensation for the incurred damage.
Another example bearing a crucial significance for Georgia is the case of Ilaşcu and others against Moldova and the Russian Federation. The European Court of Human Rights judged in respect to a citizen of Moldova, Ilaşcu and his group members on 8 July 2004. The armed conflict in Moldova violated practically all aspects of the universally recognized principles for the protection of fundamental human rights. An illegitimate court of the Transdniestrian separatist regime issued Ilaşcu a death penalty, while the others were sentenced to many years of imprisonment. The detainees were kept in the territory of a Russian  military base. They were subject to an inhuman treatment –  tortured, denied food, disallowed to receive visits from relatives or representatives of international organizations. They were also deprived of a possibility to send or receive mail and contact a lawyer or other courts. Owing to the efforts of the international community and the European Court of Human Rights Ilaşcu and his group were freed and were afforded a substantial compensation.
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered three judgements on 24 February 2005 with regard to a complaint of violated rights filed by six citizens of Russia (Khashiev and Akaev vs Russia, Isaeva, Yousopouva and Bazaeva vs Russia, Zara Isaeva vs. Russia). The Court deliberated on the violation of rights of the Chechen citizens, contending that the responsibility for the violations fully rested with the Russian Federation, and obliged this latter to pay respective compensations to the plaintiffs.
In addition to the above, the book brings up the facts related to the Rwandan developments in the 80’s and 90’s  of the last century.  On 8 November 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Tribunal for Rwanda to deliberate on the acts of genocide  committed in the territory of Rwanda. In total, the tribunal delivered 18 judgements.
    
***
The European system of justice for the protection of human rights contains one foremost feature, as it can receive, admit and judge on the claims lodged by one state against another.  According to Chapter 33 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and  Fundamental Freedoms, any member of the Convention is entitled  to bring a complaint to the Court regarding a suspected violation  of the Convention and its Protocols by another state. The CoE member-states have resorted to this measure in numerous instances. These instances relate to six cases: Greece vs United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (two complaints form Greece against the United Kingdom concerning the situation in Cyprus in 1956-67), Austria vs Italy (six juveniles claiming that they were deprived of the right to fair judgment in connection with the killing of a customs officer), Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden against Greece (four plaintiffs claiming being tortured by Greek colonels), Cyprus vs Turkey (1978, two claimants from Cyprus claiming the violation of the rights of Greek-Cypriots by Turkey following the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey), Ireland vs the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (twelve suspected members of the Irish Republican Army being subject to five forms of inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogation), Cyprus against Turkey (regarding the outcomes of operations in the northern part of Cyprus), Denamrk, France, Netherlands, Norway  and Sweden against Turkey (1985, five applications which, pursuant to Chapter 25, involved Turkey’s consent on the admission of individual petitions), Denmark vs. Turkey (the actions of the Turkish authorities against a Danish citizen), and Cyprus vs Turkey ( 1997, mass violation of human rights in northern Cyprus).
Among the above, special attention is given to consideration of the Cyprus vs Turkey case. The court’s judgement on this case provided a new significant precedent suitable for the resolution of disputes between states.
***

The Book places a special focus on the economic aspects of conflicts.  Alongside with the protection of human rights, economic development features as an essential factor which determines the ranking of states in the world democratic community. The reason  why so many countries fail to gain a firm footing in the world community is that they are unable to break away from the ‘vicious circle’ of conflicts - poverty and a weak civil society contributes to the emergence of armed conflicts, while conflicts, in turn, hamper the economic progress and the building of democratic institutions.   
According to the World Bank’s report, over the recent fifteen years, 80% of the poorest countries of the world have been embroiled in large civil conflicts; in those countries where the war has already ended, the threat of renewal of armed confrontation five years after the hostilities remains as high as 40%. And, even if such countries make a rapid advancement under peaceful conditions, they will still take years and years before they can attain the pre-war economic level.  It is beyond any doubt that without economic progress it would hardly be possible to attain a sustainable peace in any region.
Chapter “Economic Aspects of Conflicts’ looks into the magnitude of losses entailed by conflicts.  In truth, one can hardly find an adequate measure to assess the human sufferings and the havoc inflicted by conflicts upon vast territories and entire countries. Large numbers of casualties, tens and hundreds of thousands of civilians expelled from their homes, shattered economies - all this is a logical outcome of conflicts, not to mention material damages that mount up to hundreds of millions, often billions of US dollars.

According to expert evaluations, the aggregate material damage resulting from conflicts in the hot spots of the former Soviet Union totals 15 billion US dollars. Although, official representatives of the affected countries often speak about amounts in losses far beyond the above figure.
The prolonged conflicts in the post-Soviet countries have mostly gone through their acute stage of hostilities onto the stage of economic confrontation.  In their rounds of settling the conflicts, parties increasingly bring up the issue of compensation of the losses incurred by them due to the actions of the other party.
Thus, Azerbaijan and Armenia rolled out their respective arguments in connection with Nagorny Karabakh, holding each other responsible for the material and moral damage and claiming compensations.
On 17 March 2006, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution on the Establishment of State Commission for evaluation of the damage caused to the country by the conflicts in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian oblast. The resolution tasks the President of Georgia to set up a state commission, in order to evaluate the losses incurred by the country in relation with these conflicts.
A second Parliament resolution, adopted on the same day, requests the President “to instruct the Georgian Government to call an international tender with a view to identifing a law firm that would prepare and bring claims to the European Court of Human Rights for the compensation of losses incurred by the country due to the conflicts.” The initiative for adopting these resolutions came from the Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia.
In our view, the responsibility for the damage caused should rest with the country which, in effect, controls both of the conflict territories. Thus, Georgia must lodge a complaint in an international court against Russia to claim at least 15 billion US dollars in compensation of damages afflicted to the country in Abkhazia and the former South Ossetian autonomous oblast (which is six times the 2006 state budget of Georgia).

Chapter “Economic Aspects of Conflicts” provides an overview of the economic component of peace operations conducted under the aegis of the United Nations. It also looks into the efficiency of the related expenditures. Sadly, these peace operations, despite the large budgets, have been valued as little effective against the expended funds.
It is commonly  known that the World Bank attaches particular significance to projects oriented toward rehabilitation and economic development of post-conflict zones. In this respect, the Monograph provides an extensive account of the activities carried out by the World Bank.
The importance of transition from a conflict economy to that of  a peaceful time is hard to overestimate. In substance, this premise should become the cornerstone of any conflict resolution process. Another requirement of major significance is ensuring the maximum legitimization of implemented economic programs. This would serve as a gate-keeping mechanism to block any possibility for such programs to become a feeding source for unlawful regimes.
There are a few examples of regions where after many years of abortive attempts, they embark on robust policies orientated towards the satisfaction of economic needs. Finally, they manage to break away from poverty and build a sustainable economic system. Such “economic wonders” include Northern Ireland (UK) and the South Tyrol  Autonomous Province (Italy). The chapter dealing with the economic aspects of conflicts provides substantial detail regarding these regions, including their economic growth rates and potential.
The Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia suggests an idea of a concrete project aimed at the economic rehabilitation of conflict zones. The project called “Product form the conflict zone’, focuses on active involvement of broad groups of population within conflict zones in the income-generating activities, coupled with   setting up a special market segment to allow the sale of locally produced goods and products.

Chapter “Economic Aspects of Conflicts” devotes special place to a detailed description of the  goals and objectives of this project, including its implementation strategies. In the view of the Parliamentary Commission, its realization should initially start with  a pilot project in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Favouring this conclusion is the fact that a large-scale rehabilitation supported by international donors is about to get underway in this territory. Hence, conditions here would be better suited for the development of intensive economic activities. What’s more, Georgian and Ossetian villages in this zone are located literally side by side, which obviously provides another prerequisite for a fuller integration of these communities through economic activities.
The aim of the “Product form the Conflict Zone” project is to create a favourable economic climate in the Tskinvali conflict region in order to contribute to the re-building of traditional relations between the conflict-torn communities and establishing a lasting peace.
The book aims to demonstrate that both the onset and further evolution of the conflict are, indeed, predictable. It provides an account of the material and human toll already taken by the current conflicts, together with the threats they pose to regional stability. In the authors’ opinion, activation of the international judicial mechanism holds an important potential for conflict-resolution. The authors’ prevailing motive in presenting substantial information regarding the structure of international courts, as well as stressing the need to expand their scope of competence and analyzing selected precedents of the case law, was to emphasize the ultimate usefulness of such structures and outline the efficient ways of drawing on these benefits, given Georgia’s reality.
Human rights and freedoms, and the economic development are the two factors most readily prone to the devastating effect of any conflict. Destructive by nature, these processes are most intricately intertwined and invariably spread beyond the confines of local significance. With this in mind, the monograph concentrates just on these two major directions: the economy  and human rights protection.

The analysis of conflicts presented in the book allowed to single out the individual and specific features of each conflict. An objective approach to the interpretation of the developments underway in Georgia must demonstrate to the international community that restoration of this country’s territorial integrity and returning the conflict zones to the fold of Georgia’s authority will be tantamount to the restoration of an essential system of values in the eyes of the civilized world.



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